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SUBJECT: DASD BRZEZINSKI DISCUSSES REGIONAL SECURITY WITH
TURKISH DEPUTY U/S SENSOY

REF: ANKARA 5266

Classified By: Ambassador Eric Edelman, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (S) Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (DASD) Ian Brzezinski requested MFA Deputy Under-Secretary Sensoy's assistance to elevate the level of U.S.-Turkey strategic dialogue. He praised Turkey's agreement to command ISAF VII. On Missile Defense, he emphasized the importance of our bilateral cooperation, urged faster progress in working group efforts and noted USG interest in conducting a site survey as part of a sensor placement study in Turkey. D U/S Sensoy emphasized that MD efforts should address all ranges of missiles and focus on population center defense, and saw gaps in MD coverage as its primary concern. Sensoy said the Turkish Air Force (TUAF) was finalizing changes to the draft space agreement. He noted Government of Turkey (GoT) disappointment at not gaining Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Core Group membership, highlighted penal code changes to criminalize the import/export of restricted dual-use items and expressed concern about Iran's nuclear program. On ISAF VII, Sensoy said the GoT would like to see an American in the Deputy Commander slot. End Summary.

12. (U) In the September 22 meeting at the MFA, DASD Brzezinski and D U/S Sensoy were joined by Ambassador Eric Edelman, OSD Director for European Affairs South Tony Aldwell, OSD Turkey Desk Officer Lisa Heald, JCS J-5 LTC Eric von Tersch, EUR/SE Deputy Director Doug Silliman and Embassy Deputy Pol-Mil Counselor Maggie Nardi, Turkish MFA Director General for International Security Affairs Haluk Ilıcak and MFA NATO Department Chiefs Alper Coskun and Atilla Gunay.

TURKISH STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

13. (S) DASD Brzezinski noted USG interest in raising the Political-Military Working Group (PMWG) discussion to a more strategic level, building on the strengths of our bilateral relationship and shared goals in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and intensifying our Defense Industrial Cooperation (DIC). This would mean deepening our dialogue on missile defense (MD), space cooperation and regional security issues. Sensoy welcomed this approach.

MISSILE DEFENSE

14. (S) D U/S Sensoy said that bilateral MD cooperation was good. The July 8 Technical Experts Group meeting had been fruitful. In his view, two issues should guide our discussions - whether bilaterally or within NATO: 1) Consideration of the full range of missiles; 2) Protection of population centers. Sensoy stated his belief that Turkey had succeeded in convincing Allies that there should be "no gap in NATO's geography" when it came to missile defense. All ranges of missiles were being discussed in NATO fora and the coverage/defense issue had come up in NATO prior to the U.S. intervention in Iraq. At that time, according to Sensoy, the GoT questioned whether Turkish population centers were adequately protected, and felt very vulnerable to what it perceived as a real threat but was later proved untrue.

15. (S) DASD Brzezinski urged faster progress in the U.S.-Turkey MD Technical Experts Group efforts. He noted USG interest in doing a sensor placement study that included a site survey in addition to modeling and simulation. Brzezinski recognized the GoT threat concerns, which he had heard first hand two years earlier when he led a USG delegation to Turkey to discuss U.S. missile defense policy and planning. Given the bilateral MD work Turkey and the U.S. had done, Brzezinski looked forward to Turkey's participation in the Missile Defense seminar the U.S. and Romania were sponsoring at the 13-14 October NATO informal ministerial in Bucharest. The seminar would examine two scenarios involving long and short range threats against Alliance forces as well as population centers. In response to DASD's question on whether the GoT preferred the bilateral or NATO MD approach, Sensoy said that the choice of forum was unimportant; the GoT was open to any method of dealing with Turkey's security concerns. DASD noted the USG preference

for a bilateral track, which was more efficient than the slower Allied approach. He noted progress the U.S. had made working bilaterally with Denmark and the UK.

16. (S) Deflecting discussion on sensor placement, Sensoy said that talk about placing sensors was technical, and he couldn't go into detail. He did say that, if this request was made, the GoT would want to see how the sensor placement would contribute to Turkey and to the alliance. This would have to be explained to the public. In Sensoy's view, sensors would be a possible target for Turkey's enemies and, therefore, a danger. DASD pointed out that, while a sensor could be a target, it also enhanced a country's ability to see more. He questioned whether being less of a target but being blind was really a better option.

IRAN

17. (S) Responding to the Ambassador's question about the GoT's perception of the Iranian nuclear threat, Sensoy acknowledged that Turkey is one of the most concerned about Iran's nuclear progress and what it means for regional stability. Sensoy said he thought the U.S. and Turkey saw eye-to-eye on this threat and were cooperating effectively in pressuring Iran to abandon its nuclear program.

CAUCASUS

18. (S) Sensoy noted GoT support for extending NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) to the Caucasus, which he considered a region of strategic importance for the USG and NATO. He pledged Turkey's cooperation, suggesting the PfP Training Center in Ankara as a forum to send this message to Caucasus countries. According to Sensoy, Turkey was meeting resistance in its efforts to help them to strengthen their democracies and join the international community. In his view, PfP policies and programs had to be tailored to each country's individual situation, with the understanding that it could take a generation to see democratic institutions and protection of human rights take hold. A rushed approach imposed from the outside could leave Russia to gain the upper hand in "giving them what they need." DASD expressed USG disappointment at the recent decision to cancel the Azerbaijan-hosted PfP exercise, Cooperative Best Effort 2004, and suggested that the presence of a NATO liaison officer there might have changed the situation.

19. (S) Sensoy called the Caucasus the "soft belly" of Russia. Putin had ended the disintegration of Russian territorial integrity but the Chechen issue was emotional for Turks given the large number of Chechens in Turkey. However, he emphasized that the GoT still supported the preservation of Russia's territorial integrity. DASD noted the potential for problems to spread to other areas. Sensoy said that, although Putin's iron-handed manner and centralized handling of the Chechen issue was not good, sympathy for the Chechens was waning after their recent actions (Note: Reference to the August Beslan hostage crisis. End Note.). He added that Putin was a strong leader, with 70 pct. popular support. His heavy-handed actions were getting tougher and the international community needed to send a unified message to Putin that there were limits to what it would tolerate. In the past, when Russia's help was needed elsewhere, such as Kosovo, there was a reluctance to press this issue. Sensoy said that Russia has been successful in making Chechnya a terrorist issue and the international community had helped create that image by being inconsistent in its message to Moscow.

AFGHANISTAN

10. (S) DASD welcomed Turkey's willingness to take command of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) VII (February-August 2005). He noted the debate among Allies over the pros and cons of unifying ISAF with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). DASD Brzezinski emphasized the importance of bringing the strengths of each mission to any future merger of ISAF and OEF. For instance ISAF had allowed Allies to manage domestic political constraints by defining their contribution as participation in stability operations, while OEF's strength was its operational flexibility to conduct kinetic operations against al Qaida remnants and their supporters. Sensoy opined that the two should eventually overlap geographically. DASD pointed out that the two did overlap, but Sensoy said further Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) expansion was needed. He added that Turkey had offered to establish a PRT in the north where the GoT thought it could be useful, but the offer was not well-received. Sensoy said he couldn't envision a time frame for unification of OEF and ISAF but did not see a rush to do so, adding that a success story in Afghanistan would have

positive repercussions elsewhere. Sensoy said that Turkey was now focused on ISAF VII but needed USG and Allied assistance to enable use of NATO Common Funds. Sensoy also mentioned that the GoT would like to see an American Major General deploy with ISAF VII as its Deputy Commander.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

¶11. (C) Sensoy underscored the GoT's disappointment in the USG reaction to Turkey's request for PSI Core Group membership. In his view, Turkey had tried its best to bring a contribution to PSI and failed to understand why Singapore and Norway, for example, had been invited into the Core Group when Turkey was not. The government felt it never got a straight answer on the rationale. That said, Turkey would cooperate in PSI efforts. DASD explained that there were no current plans to reconvene the Core Group, and underscored that the action was with the Operational Experts Group. He expressed his disappointment that Turkey had not been as aggressive or eager as others and that its delegations to operational experts meetings (with the exception of the August meetings in Oslo and Copenhagen) had been less than robust. The USG had expected more from Turkey, given its abilities and experience.

¶12. (C) In response, Sensoy wondered why Turkey had not been invited as one of the original eleven PSI members if its contribution was valued. He said the GoT had had to overcome legal restraints on its naval forces activities and to determine the best way to contribute following its late invitation. Having done that, Sensoy said Turkey demonstrated significant interest only to receive a negative response on the Core Group. Ambassador emphasized that the Core Group was never intended to be an Executive Committee, but rather a small steering group to articulate core principles. Having done that it may cease to function. Some Allies wanted to dissolve the group. The Ambassador expressed his hope that Turkey could overcome its concern. Given its extensive knowledge about illicit networks like AQ Khan, Turkey had a valuable role to play.

OTHER REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

¶13. (S) Sensoy ticked off the status of other security issues. He said TUAF was making the final touches to its revision of the revised Space MoU submitted by the USG this summer. The MFA would need to review the document but Sensoy didn't foresee any problems there. Referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting on Iran, Sensoy said the GoT was very concerned about Iran's nuclear program. Turkey wanted Iran to stop the program and dismantle its weapons supply. Touching on Turkey's sale of dual-use items to Libya, Sensoy said the GoT had been very cooperative and forthcoming and noted the MFA had been instructed to be as transparent as possible. He highlighted the last minute addition to the penal code of language to criminalize the import/export of restricted items.

¶14. (U) This cable was cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Ian Brzezinski.

¶15. (U) Baghdad and Kabul minimize considered.
EDELMAN